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Background: Previous research showed that individuals have a natural tendency to conform to others. This study
investigated the temporal characteristics of neural processing involved in social conformity by recording
participants’ brain potentials in performing a line judgment task. After making his initial choice, a participant was
presented with the choices of four same-sex group members, which could be congruent or highly or moderately
incongruent with the participant’s own choice. The participant was then immediately given a second opportunity
to respond to the same stimulus.
Results: Participants were more likely to conform to the group members by changing their initial choices when
these choices were in conflict with the group’s choices, and this behavioral adjustment occurred more often as the
level of incongruence increased. Electrophysiologically, group choices that were incongruent with the participant’s
choice elicited more negative-going medial frontal negativity (MFN), a component associated with processing
expectancy violation, than those that were congruent with the participant’s choice, and the size of this effect
increased as the level of incongruence increased. Moreover, at both levels of incongruence, the MFN responses
were more negative-going for incongruent trials in which participants subsequently performed behavioral
adjustment than for trials in which they stuck to their initial choices. Furthermore, over individual participants,
participants who were more likely to conform to others (i.e., changing their initial choices) exhibited stronger MFN
effect than individuals who were more independent.
Conclusions: These findings suggest that incongruence with group choices or opinions can elicit brain responses that
are similar to those elicited by violation of non-social expectancy in outcome evaluation and performance monitoring,
and these brain signals are utilized in the following behavioral adjustment. The present research complements recent
brain imaging studies by showing the temporal characteristics of neural processing involved in social conformity and
by suggesting common mechanisms for reinforcement learning in social and non-social situations.
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Individuals tend to change their initial choices or opi-
nions to match with the majority of the group they are
in, a phenomenon that has been termed as social con-
formity [1]. Since Asch’s pioneering experiment using a
line judgment task [2], different motivations underlying
social conformity have been explored in a number of
studies (see [3] for a review). Individuals have the desire* Correspondence: xz104@pku.edu.cn
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orto form an accurate interpretation of reality and when
information concerning reality is insufficient, they may
rely on others to provide such information or interpret-
ation and behave accordingly (informational conformity).
Individuals also have the desire to obtain approval from
group members and may change their behavior to avoid
social rejection, even though they privately continue to
hold their original attitudes (normative conformity; see
[4]). These two processes are closely interrelated and dif-
ficult to disentangle theoretically and empirically [5].
Recent studies focus on the brain structures involved in
social conformity, showing that social norms (group opi-
nions) may alter the brain activity involved in perceiving the
task-relevant information. Berns et al. [6] found thattd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
Chen et al. BMC Neuroscience 2012, 13:43 Page 2 of 10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/13/43erroneous responses of others could alter participants’ initial
judgment in a mental rotation task and the brain activity in
regions implicated in mental rotation. Zaki et al. [7] demon-
strated that exposure to social norms, i.e., group opinions,
affected individual’s neural representations of subjective
value assigned to stimuli by increasing the activity in brain
regions involved in reward processing, such as nucleus
accumbens and orbitofrontal cortex (see also [8]). On the
other hand, when individuals stick to their own choices in
face of group members’ conflicting opinions, the brain
regions involved in emotion processing, such as amygdala
and caudate are activated [6]; when individuals find out that
their own choices are different from the majority of the
group, the brain regions associated with negative affective
states, i.e., anterior insula and anterior cingulate, are acti-
vated [9], and these activations may promote the subse-
quent behavioral adjustment. A study by Klucharev et al.
[10] found that conflict with group opinions triggered activa-
tion in the rostral cingulate zone and deactivation in the ven-
tral striatum and signal changes in these regions predicted
subsequent conforming behavioral adjustment. A follow-up
study [11] demonstrated that transient down-regulation of
these brain regions by theta-burst transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS) reduced conformity, suggesting that so-
cial conformity is possibly underlined by the mechanisms
that comply with principles of reinforcement learning.
The purpose of the present study was to complement the
above neuroimaging studies by investigating the temporal
characteristics of neural processing involved in social con-
formity. Here we developed a variant of Asch’s line judgment
task in which participants were asked to judge the length of
lines while their brain potentials were recorded through the
event-related potential (ERP) technique. After a participant
made his initial (binary) choice, he was informed of theFigure 1 Sequence of events in a single trial.choices of other four group members, which could be con-
gruent or highly or moderately incongruent with his own
choice. The participant was immediately given a second op-
portunity to respond to the same stimuli. This response
would be then socially conformative (i.e., the present choice
differed from the initial one but is consistent with the group’s
choice) or independent (i.e., no change; see Figure 1). For
the “highly incongruent” trials, a participant’s initial choice
would differ from the choices of 3 or 4 (out of 4) group
members; for the “moderately incongruent” trials, the parti-
cipant’s initial choice would be inconsistent with the choices
of 2 group members but consistent with the choices of the
other two. For the “congruent” trials, the participant’s initial
choice would be consistent with the choices of 3 or 4 group
members.
We focused on the medial frontal negativity (MFN) or
the feedback-related negativity (FRN), an ERP component
that has been shown to be particularly sensitive to neuro-
cognitive processes involved in outcome evaluation and
performance monitoring. The FRN, which is a negative de-
flection peaking between 200 ms and 350 ms at frontocen-
tral recording sites, has been shown to be more
pronounced for negative feedback associated with unfavor-
able outcomes, such as incorrect responses [12], monetary
losses [13], or violations of expectancy [14,15], than for
positive feedback. Importantly, recent studies extended the
role of FRN in outcome evaluation and performance mon-
itoring to the social domain and found that violations of
social norms, such as unfair offers in asset division, also
elicit more negative-going FRN (or MFN) than fair offers
[16-19]. In such studies, participants were offered either
fair (e.g., 50%) or unfair (e.g., 10%) divisions of assets
(monetary reward) and ERPs were time-locked to the pres-
entation of such division schemes. Although participants
Figure 2 The rate of making behavioral adjustment (i.e.,
making a response different from the initial one) in the second
presentation of the line stimulus, depicted as a function of the
incongruence level. Error bars represented standard errors of the
means.
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their actions or choices, a division scheme may be never-
theless compared with an implicit, long-established social
norm concerning asset distribution and any violation of
this norm by the division scheme would elicit the FRN or,
more accurately, the MFN responses. Based on these stud-
ies and based on the suggestion that social group norms
evoke conformity via mechanisms of reinforcement learn-
ing [10], we predicted that group choices incongruent with
the participants’ own initial choices in the line judgment
task would elicit more negative-going MFN responses on
the participants than congruent group choices, as mis-
match with others constitutes a kind of violation of social
norms [3]. Moreover, the magnitude of MFN might in-
crease as a function of the level of incongruence. Further-
more, we hypothesized that the magnitude of MFN in
perceiving incongruent group choices could be differen-
tiated according to whether the participants subsequently
changed their initial choices. In other words, more nega-
tive-going MFN responses would lead to a higher likeli-
hood of the participants subsequently changing their
initial choices. Finally, across participants, the size of the
MFN difference could also predict individual differences
in whether changing initial choices to conform to group
opinions. Such findings would provide important insights
concerning the temporal characteristics of neural pro-
cesses underlying social conformity.
Results
Among the twenty-four EEG participants, four partici-
pants stated that they disbelieved the setup of the experi-
ment in a post-test questionnaire; one participant
conformed to group members in less than 5 trials for ei-
ther highly or moderately incongruent conditions. These
participants were excluded from further data analysis.
Behavioral results
Trials in which the participants did not respond within
time limit (2 seconds) to the initial and/or second presen-
tation of the line stimulus were excluded from data ana-
lysis, amounting to 1.18% of the total data points (180
trials for the “highly incongruent”, 140 for the “moderately
incongruent”, and 180 for the “congruent” for each partici-
pant). Trials in which the participants changed their initial
choices during the second presentation of the line stimulus
(i.e., exhibiting social conformity) were encoded as
“change” (as opposed to “no change”) trials. We calculated
the change rate as the percent of change trials out of the
total trials at each level of incongruence.
As indicated by Figure 2, the rate of change increased as a
function of the incongruence level. Analysis of variance
(ANOVA) revealed a significant main effect, F(2, 36)=43.81,
p< 0.001, with the differences between conditions all being
significant (ps< 0.01): highly incongruent (mean±SD,0.60±0.29) vs. moderately incongruent (0.16±0.11) vs. con-
gruent (0.07±0.13) condition.
ERP results
We focused on the ERP responses time-locked to the pres-
entation of group choices (Figure 3A), using the mean
amplitudes in the 250–350 ms time window for statistical
purpose. ANOVA with level of incongruence (highly incon-
gruent vs. moderately incongruent vs. congruent), electrode
row (Fz row, FCz row, Cz row, CPz row, Pz row) and lat-
erality (left, left-middle, middle and right-middle, right) as
three within-participant factors found a significant main ef-
fect of incongruence level, F(2, 36) = 64.57, p< 0.001, sug-
gesting that the MFN responses were increasingly more
negative-going for the congruent trials (8.56± 1.13 μV), the
moderately incongruent trials (5.72± 1.07 μV), and the
highly incongruent trials (3.98± 1.13 μV). The differences
between conditions were all significant after Bonferroni
correction, ps< 0.001. The main effect of electrode row
was also significant, F(4, 72) = 5.00, p< 0.01, and it inter-
acted with level of incongruence, F(8, 144) = 6.17, p< 0.001.
It is clear from Figure 4A that, against the congruent condi-
tion, the congruence (i.e., the MFN) effects for both the
highly incongruent and moderately incongruent conditions
were larger at anterior-frontal sites.
Given that the MFN waveforms could be affected by
subsequent P300 responses which are mainly associated
with low frequency EEGs, we filtered the EEG data with a
2 – 20 Hz bandpass (see [14,20,21] for similar treatments).
Mean amplitudes in the 250 – 350 ms time window after
filtering were submitted to the 3 (highly incongruent vs.
moderately incongruent vs. congruent) × 5 (Fz row, FCz
row, Cz row, CPz row, Pz row) × 5 (left, left-middle, middle
and right-middle, right) repeated-measures ANOVA. The
pattern of effects was essentially the same as the one in
the above analysis. The main effect of incongruence level
Figure 3 (A) ERP responses at the midline Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, and Pz, time-locked to the onset of the presentation of group choices and
categorized by level of incongruence. The shaded 250–350 ms window was for the calculation of the mean amplitudes of the MFN responses; (B) ERP
responses at the midline Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz and Pz, time-locked to the onset of the presentation of incongruent group choices and categorized by subsequent
behavioral tendency (change vs. no change), clasping over the highly and moderately incongruent conditions. The shaded 250–350 ms window was for the
calculation of the mean amplitudes of the MFN responses.
Chen et al. BMC Neuroscience 2012, 13:43 Page 4 of 10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/13/43
Figure 4 (A) topographic maps for the MFN effects evoked by
group choices, categorized by level of incongruence; (B)
topographic maps for the MFN differences evoked by
incongruent group choices, categorized by behavioral tendency
(change vs. no change).
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the MFN responses were increasingly more negative-going
for the congruent (0.26 ± 0.32 μV), the moderately incon-
gruent (−0.54± 0.23 μV), and the highly incongruent
(−1.05± 0.32 μV) trials. The interaction between electrode
rows and incongruence level was also significant, F(8,
144) = 4.93, p< 0.02, suggesting that the MFN effect varied
over electrode sites (the largest in the anterior-frontal re-
gion). Detailed comparisons confirmed this observation.
Note that, for simplicity of report, the following analysis
on the MFN effect was restricted to the effect manifested
on the anterior-frontal electrodes (F3, F1, Fz, F2, F4, FC3,
FC1, FCz, FC2, FC4) where the MFN effect was the largest.
To examine whether the MFN responses in processing
group choices was predictive of whether the participants
would subsequently change their initial choices in the
second presentation of line stimulus, we compared ERP
responses for moderately and highly incongruent trials
that were followed by behavioral adjustment with those
trials in which the participants stick with their initial
choices (Figure 3B). Here we analyzed the data in two
ways. Firstly we collapsed ERP responses over the moder-
ately and highly incongruent trials but divided them accord-
ing to whether the participants changed or stuck to their
initial choices in the trials (Figure 3B). ANOVA with behav-
ioral tendency (change vs. no change) and electrode as two
within-participant factors found a significant main effect ofbehavioral adjustment, F(1, 18) = 11.24, p< 0.01, with trials
containing choice change eliciting more negative-going
FRN responses (2.32±1.16 μV) than trials containing no
change (3.56±1.12 μV). A potential problem with this ana-
lysis is that it ignored the possibility of the MFN effect for
behavioral adjustment interacting with the level of incon-
gruence. Therefore we conducted a second analysis in
which the incongruent level (highly vs. moderately incon-
gruent), behavioral tendency (change vs. no change), and
electrode were treated as three within-participant factors.
Given that 5 participants (out of the 19) exhibited behav-
ioral adjustment (i.e., changing their choices) in less than 10
trials at either the high incongruent or moderately incon-
gruent level, these participants were excluded from analysis
(see [16,22] for similar treatments). ANOVA revealed a sig-
nificant main effect of behavioral adjustment, F(1,
13)= 8.32, p< 0.02, with trials involving choice change eli-
citing more negative-going MFN responses (4.38±1.40 μV)
than trials involving no change (5.31±1.40 μV). Import-
antly, this behavioral adjustment effect was not affected by
the level of incongruence (on the anterior-frontal electrodes;
see Figure 4B), as the interaction between behavioral ten-
dency and level of incongruence was far from being signifi-
cant, F(1, 13)< 1. Thus the two ways of data analysis
produced the same pattern of behavioral adjustment effect.
Note, in this analysis we did not include the “congruent”
condition in which the participants were shown group
choices consistent with their own. Here the participant
faced no conflict between their own choices and group
opinions, and hence they tended in general to stick to their
initial choices. For the small percentage of trials they did
change their mind (7%), it was unlikely that the partici-
pants performed the change out of social conformity.
In addition, we used a trial-by-trial binary logistic regres-
sion to investigate whether the MFN response was predict-
ive of subsequent behavior in a particular trial. Mean
amplitudes in each 100 ms time window from 150 ms to
550 ms were defined as four independent variables in each
trial, with the MFN referring to the second time window
(250 – 350 ms, i.e., the second variable). When the four
variables were entered into the regression analysis simul-
taneously, only the MFN predicted whether the participant
would make change vs. no change choice in the highly in-
congruent condition, Wald= 5.76, p< 0.05, with the per-
centage of accurate prediction being 56.7%. For the
moderately incongruent condition, however, this analysis
did not find anything significant. Entering the MFN first
into the regression and then other variables would yield
essentially the same pattern of effects.
For individual differences, we performed two types of
analysis. In the first type, we split the 19 participants into
two groups according to the individual index of conformity,
which subtracts the rate of change in the congruent condi-
tion from the rate in the highly incongruent condition
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more likely the participants would conform to others under
social influence. After the median split, the high confor-
mists (N=10) had a mean index of 0.83 (SD=0.12) while
the low conformists (N = 9) had a mean index of 0.21
(SD= 0.18). ANOVA over the mean amplitudes in the
MFN time window, with the participant type as a be-
tween-participant factor and behavioral tendency
(change vs. no change) and electrode as two within-
participant factors, revealed a significant main effect
of behavioral tendency, F(1, 17) = 12.81, p< 0.01, with the
MFN responses more negative-going for the “change”
(2.34 ± 1.19 μV) than for the “no change” (3.55 ± 1.36 μV)
trials. Importantly, this main effect was qualified by a sig-
nificant interaction between behavioral tendency and par-
ticipant type, F(1,17) = 4.93, p< 0.04. Simple-effect tests
showed that for the high conformist group, the MFN
responses were more negative-going for the “change” trials
(1.83 ± 1.64 μV) than for the “no change” trials
(3.78 ± 1.59 μV), F(1,9) = 14.19, p< 0.01. However, this
contrast did not reach statistical significance for the low
conformist group, F(1, 8) = 1.22, p> 0.30.
In the second type of analysis, we computed the correl-
ation, over individual participants, between the size of the
MFN difference between the “change” and “no change”
trials and the index of conformity (Figure 5B). This correl-
ation was significant, r=−0.47, p< .05, indicating that the
more likely a participant conformed to group members,
the more negative the MFN difference was.
Discussion
This study demonstrates that individuals are more likely to
conform to group members by changing their initial
choices when these choices are in conflict with the major-
ity of group members’ choices, and this behavioral adjust-
ment occurs more often as the level of incongruence
between the individual’s and the group’s choices increases.
Electrophysiologically, we found that group choices that
were incongruent with the participant’s choice elicitedFigure 5 (A) mean MFN responses in the “change” and “no change” t
between the individual index of conformity and the MFN difference b
and moderately incongruent conditions.more negative-going medial frontal negativity (MFN) or
feedback-related negativity (FRN), a component associated
with the processing of expectancy violation, than those
that were congruent with the participant’s choice. As the
level of incongruence between the participant’s choice and
the group choices increased, so too did the size of the
effects on the MFN or FRN. Moreover, the MFN
responses were more negative-going for incongruent trials
in which participants subsequently performed behavioral
adjustment (“change” trials) than for trials in which they
stick to their initial choices (“no change” trials). Further-
more, over individual participants, participants who were
more likely to conform to others (i.e., changing their initial
choices) when facing incongruent group opinions exhib-
ited stronger MFN differences between “change” and “no
change” trials than individuals who behave more inde-
pendently (i.e., sticking to their initial choices).
Previous studies have demonstrated that unexpected
outcomes in decision making elicit more negative-going
FRN/MFN responses than expected outcomes, suggesting
that the FRN/MFN is sensitive to prediction error in
reinforcement learning [15,20,23,24]. Although a version
of the reinforcement learning theory [25] distinguished
“positive prediction error” (i.e., “the result is better than
expected”) and “negative prediction error” (i.e., “the result
is worse than expected”) and suggested that the two types
of prediction errors are conveyed by differential impacts of
the midbrain dopamine signals upon the activity in the an-
terior cingulated cortex (ACC), recent studies demon-
strated that the MFN is possibly modulated by expectancy,
with unexpected outcome eliciting more negative-going
MFN responses, regardless of whether the violated expect-
ancy is positive or negative [26]. Oliveira et al. [26] found
that the FRN could be elicited by positive feedback when
the participant was expecting negative feedback, and vice
versa. The authors proposed an expectancy-deviation hy-
pothesis according to which the outcome monitoring sys-
tem compares the participant’s expected feedback to the
actual feedback and the FRN is elicited when a mismatchrials for the high vs. low conformist group; (B) Correlation
etween “change” and “no change” trials, clasping over the highly
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lated orthogonally the reward valence, reward magnitude,
and expectancy towards magnitude in a monetary gam-
bling task. They found that the FRN effect on the feedback
was sensitive not only to reward valence, but also to ex-
pectancy towards reward magnitude, with violation of ex-
pectancy eliciting more negative-going FRN responses.
Thus it appears that the prediction error can be defined
not only in terms of the valence of outcome but also in
terms of whether the outcome fits pre-established, non-
valence expectancy [15,26,27]. Further studies are needed
to specifically address the differentiation between valence-
based vs. expectancy-based account of the MFN/FRN
effect.
Violations of social expectancy or social norms can also
elicit enhanced MFN responses. It has been consistently
found that unfair offers in economic exchanges evoke
more negative-going MFN (or FRN) responses than fair
offers [16-19]. Wu et al. went further to demonstrate that,
compared with fair offers, both disadvantageous (negative)
unfair offers and advantageous (positive) unfair offers eli-
cited more negative-going MFN responses (Wu, Hu, van
Dijk, Leliveld, Zhou: Brain activity in fairness consider-
ation during asset distribution: Does the initial ownership
play a role?, submitted).The MFN effect may reflect the
detection of social expectancy violation as egalitarian dis-
tribution of assets is an expected social norm [28,29]. Dur-
ing evolution, the human brain may have developed
specific mechanisms to detect ongoing deviations from so-
cial norms [30]. It is possible that these mechanisms share
the same neural correlates as those engaged in predicting
errors during non-social reinforcement learning [10,31].
The MFN can therefore reflect not only the encoding of
prediction errors for monetary reward or performance
feedback but also violations of expectancy toward social
norms. In the present study, individuals could compare
their initial choices with opinions of other group members
and the difference with others could be encoded as a pre-
diction error. A recent ERP study on social conformity also
suggested that social deviance activates the brain’s error-
monitoring system [32].
In this study, we also found that MFN responses in pro-
cessing group choices incongruent with the participants’
own choices can be predictive of whether they would sub-
sequently change their mind when they were given a sec-
ond opportunity to make line judgment (c.f., [22]). At both
levels of incongruence, trials in which the participants
changed their mind showed more negative-going MFN
responses than trials in which they stick to their initial
judgment. The reinforcement-learning theory of MFN
[25,33] suggests that the MFN reflects the coding of pre-
diction error in the midbrain dopamine system, which
sends signals to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and
guides action selection mediated by the ACC through thereinforcement of action associated with positive reward
and the punishment of action associated with negative
outcomes. Social conformity can be considered a type of
goal-directed action in which the goals of behavior include
maximizing the rewards following accurate performance
and social acceptance, and minimizing the punishment fol-
lowing erroneous response and social rejection [3]. In the
present study, the more negative going MFN responses for
the “change” trials, as opposed to the “no change” trials,
demonstrated stronger neural signals sent to ACC, which
guided subsequent behavioral adjustment (i.e., actions con-
sistent with group opinions or social norm). Indeed, a re-
cent fMRI study also showed that the amplitude of
conflict-related signal in brain regions implicated in
reinforcement learning, i.e., rostral cingulate zone and the
ventral striatum, can predict subsequent behavioral con-
formity [10].
The account that social conformity is instantiated via
reinforcement learning mechanisms is further strength-
ened by the finding that individuals who were more likely
to conform to the others exhibited a stronger MFN differ-
ence between “change” and “no change” trials when com-
pared with individual who were less likely to change their
mind. Previous studies have shown that the MFN
responses are sensitive to individual differences along dif-
ferent dimensions, including personality or morality. For
example, Yeung et al. [34] reported a correlation between
the MFN amplitude and the participants’ rating on how
much they felt to be involved in the gambling task, with
larger MFN amplitudes corresponding to higher involve-
ment ratings. Boksem and De Cremer [16] found that the
MFN amplitude was more pronounced in perceiving un-
fair, as opposed to fair, offers and this effect was larger for
participants with higher concerns for fairness than for par-
ticipants with lower concerns. Violation of social norms is
a kind of prediction error that can be utilized as
reinforcement learning signal for subsequent behavioral
adjustment. The more significant the prediction error is
valued by an individual, the more likely he would subse-
quently change mind to conform to others (see also [10]).
Note that, in the above discussion, we have largely categor-
ized the conformity effect we observed as “normative con-
formity” and attributed the desire to be consistent with
others in choice selection as a kind of social reinforcement.
However, it is also possible that participants had simply used
others’ choices in line judgment as a source of information
in order to make more accurate judgment (i.e., informational
conformity). As most studies on social conformity, the ex-
perimental design we used could not allow us to definitely
differentiate the two types of conformity. A possible way to
improve the design is to include a control condition in
which the group opinions come from computer programs
(see [35]). However, if the computer programs generate
choices based on stored knowledge, participants might
Chen et al. BMC Neuroscience 2012, 13:43 Page 8 of 10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/13/43anthropomorphize the computer programs (i.e., treating
the computers as humanized agents), and the conformity
effect obtained in this situation can still be taken as being
out of normative conformity; if the computer programs
generate choices randomly, participants might treat these
choices differently. Indeed, providing participants with
"buy" or "not buy" choices of stocks randomly produced by
four chimpanzees [36] or providing participants with at-
tractiveness judgment of human faces randomly produced
by computers [11] did affect participants’ choice behavior,
but these effects were much weaker than the impacts of
group choices produced by human peers.
Moreover, group opinions produced by human peers
and group choices generated by computer programs
elicit differential neural signals in brain regions impli-
cated in reinforcement learning but not in brain regions
involved in sensory-perceptual processing [11]. Taken to-
gether, one might conclude that the conformity effect
observed in this and some other studies is essentially out
of normative conformity. That is, participants’ subse-
quent behavioral adjustment “is mediated by the
reinforcement learning mechanism in which both reward
for being aligned with group and aversion to being non-
aligned may have acted as reinforcers” [11].
Another issue that needs discussion concerns whether
the MFN effect observed might be explained in terms of
attention devoted to the congruence of group opinions.
In particular, the participants might have paid less atten-
tion at the start of some trials, making them ignore the
group opinions. Consequently they showed smaller
neural responses to incongruent group opinions and a
weaker tendency to subsequently adjust their choices.
However, this line of argument seems implausible as the
P300, which is generally believed to reflect the distribu-
tion of attentional resources [37], was actually more
positive for the “no change” trials than for the “change”
trials (Figure 3B).
Conclusions
By manipulating the level of (in)congruence between the
participants’ initial choices and group members’ choices
in a line judgment task, the present study demonstrated
that 1) incongruent group choices would elicit more
negative going MFN responses than congruent ones
when the participants were presented with the choices;
2) incongruent group choices in trials in which the parti-
cipants changed their mind when given the second op-
portunity to make line judgment elicited more negative-
going MFN responses than incongruent group choices in
trials in which the participant stuck to their original
opinion; 3) over individual participants, participants who
were more likely to conform to others exhibited stronger
MFN differences between “change” and “no change”
trials than those who were not. These findings suggestthat incongruence with group choices or opinions (which
acts as a kind of social norm) can elicit brain responses
that are similar to those elicited by violation of non-so-
cial expectancy in outcome evaluation and performance
monitoring, and these brain signals can be utilized in the
following behavioral adjustment. The present study com-
plements recent brain imaging studies by showing that
the brain rapidly computes the social norm based on
group members’ opinions and compares one’s own ac-
tion with the norm. The study also suggests common




Twenty-four undergraduate and graduate students
(13 females; mean age 22.5 years, SD = 1.93) partici-
pated in the experiment. Four students, who were
strangers to the participants, were recruited as con-
federates. To exclude possible influence of sex on so-
cial conformity, each EEG participant was grouped
with 4 same-sex confederates [38].
All the participants were right-handed and had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. They had no history of
neurological or psychiatric disorders. Informed consent
was obtained from each participant before the test. The
experiment was performed in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the Ethics
Committee of the Department of Psychology, Peking
University. Each participant was paid 60 Chinese yuan
(about USD$ 9.5) as basic payment and was informed
that additional monetary reward would be paid accord-
ing to their performance in the task.
Design and procedures
The experiment used a one-factor within-participant de-
sign with three levels of group choice. For the highly in-
congruent condition, three or four group members made
choices different from the participant’ initial choice; for
the moderately incongruent condition, two group mem-
bers made choices different from the participant’s while
the other two members made the same choices; for the
congruent condition, one or no group member made
choices different from the participant’s.
When a participant came to the laboratory, he and the
four confederates were told that they would sit in separate
rooms to complete a task together through the computer
network. By assigning the participant and the confederates
pre-determined cards, they were ostensively led to separate
cubicles to play different roles in the task. The participant
was then told that he as well as the other four group mem-
bers would finish a line judgment task together. He was
also informed of the procedures of the experiment
(Figure 1). That is, at the beginning of each trial, the
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with a length of either 5.5 or 6.0 cm, on either left or right
side of the screen (with one color appearing at one side in
half of the trials) and a horizontal black line (with a length
of 6.0 cm). He had to judge which one of the two vertical
lines is of the same length as the horizontal one by press-
ing a button with the index finger of the left or right hand
(i.e., a binary judgment). The position of the horizontal
line was either on the top of or on the bottom of the two
vertical lines while the relative positions of the two vertical
lines varied slightly along the vertical orientation over
trials. Participants reported in a post-experiment question-
naire that it was almost impossible for them to be sure
which vertical line (with a difference of 0.29 degree in vis-
ual angle between the lines) was of the same length as the
horizontal line. A detailed examination of the participants’
responses showed that the accuracy of the participants’
responses (i.e., choosing the vertical line with 6.0 cm) was
43.38%, which did not differ significantly from the chance
level (50%), t(18) = 1.27, p> 0.1.
The participant was then presented with a frame indi-
cating, through coloring cartoon figures, how many of
the 4 other group members had chosen the red or blue
lines. The group choices were predetermined by a com-
puter program without the participant’s knowledge, and
red or blue lines were randomly assigned. The participant
was shown the same line stimulus again, and was
instructed to indicate his choice the second time by press-
ing a response button. The participant was informed be-
fore the experiment that the computer would record his
responses and the extra payment was dependent upon the
accuracy of his second choice in each trial. The time line
of the presentation of each frame in each trial was illu-
strated in Figure 1.
The participant was comfortably seated about 1.0 m in
front of a computer screen in a dimly lit room. The experi-
ment was administered on a computer with a Del 22-inch
CRT display using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral
System Inc.) to control the presentation and timing of the
stimuli. For the highly incongruent condition, all the four
group members’ choices were different from the partici-
pant’s in 120 trials and three members’ choices were differ-
ent in 60 trials. For the moderately incongruent condition,
two group members’ choices were different from the partici-
pant’s in 140 trials. For the congruent condition, three
group members (but one) had the same choice as the par-
ticipant in 60 trials, and all the four group members had the
same choice as the participant in 120 trials. The 500 trials
were randomly mixed and were divided in equal numbers
into 5 test blocks with the restriction that no more than
three consecutive trials were at the same incongruence
level. A practice block of 30 trials in which the participants
underwent the same procedure as that in the formal test
was administered to familiarize the participants with the ex-periment. Participants were debriefed, paid, and thanked at
the end of the experiment.
EEG recording and analysis
EEGs were recorded from 64 scalp sites using tin electro-
des mounted in an elastic cap (Brain Products, Munich,
Germany) according to the international 10–20 system.
The vertical electrooculogram (VEOGs) was recorded
supra-orbitally from the right eye. The horizontal EOG
(HEOG) was recorded from electrodes placed at the outer
canthus of the left eye. All EEGs and EOGs were refer-
enced online to an external electrode, which was placed
on the tip of nose, and were re-referenced offline to the
mean of the left and right mastoids. Electrode impedance
was kept below 10 kΩ for EOG channels and below 5 kΩ
for all other electrodes. The bio-signals were amplified
with a bandpass from 0.016 to 100 Hz and digitized on-
line with a sampling frequency of 500 Hz.
Separate EEG epochs of 1000 ms (with a 200-ms pre-
stimulus baseline) were extracted offline, time-locked to
the onset of group opinion. Ocular artifacts were cor-
rected with an eye-movement correction algorithm that
employs a regression analysis in combination with
artifact averaging [39]. Epochs were baseline-corrected
by subtracting from each sample the average activity of
that channel during the baseline period. All the trials in
which EEG voltages exceeded a threshold of ± 80 μV dur-
ing recording were excluded from further analysis. The
EEG data were low-pass filtered below 30 Hz.
For the MFN, the mean amplitudes in the time win-
dow of 250–350 ms were analyzed. This time window
was selected according to the classical definitions for the
MFN and according to visual inspection of waveforms.
The Greenhouse-Geisser correction for violation of the
assumption of sphericity was applied where appropriate.
The Bonferroni correction was used for multiple
comparisons.
The mean number of trials that was entered in MFN ana-
lysis was 132.2 (ranging from 79 to 175) per participant for
the highly incongruent condition, 100.1 (from 52 to 131)
for the moderately incongruent condition, and 133.7 (from
71 to 173) for the congruent condition. After discarding the
five participants who had less than 10 “change” trials in
either the highly or the moderately incongruent condition,
for the remaining 14 participants, the mean number of trials
that was entered into the “change” vs. “no change” compari-
son was 70.4 (for “change”, ranging from 27 to 156) and
54.9 (for “no change”, ranging from 17 to 111) per partici-
pant in the highly incongruent condition and were 23.1
(ranging from 11 to 38) and 73.3 (ranging from 12 to 106)
per participant in the moderately incongruent condition.
It is clear from Figure 3 that the choice congruence ef-
fect and difference between “change” and “no” change”
trials appeared not only in the MFN window, but also in
Chen et al. BMC Neuroscience 2012, 13:43 Page 10 of 10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/13/43a later, possibly the P300, time window. But given that
the pattern of effects in the later time window was essen-
tially the same as the one for the MFN, we did not report
the analysis of the effects in this window.
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